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Abstract 
 
Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal 
states (i.e. credal states representable only by sets of credence functions) rather than precise 
ones (i.e. credal states representable by single credence functions). Some writers have 
recently argued that this claim conflicts with accuracy-centered epistemology, i.e., the 
project of justifying epistemic norms by appealing solely to the overall accuracy of the 
doxastic states they recommend. But these arguments are far from decisive. In this essay, we 
prove some new results, which show that there is little hope for reconciling the rationality of 
credal imprecision with accuracy-centered epistemology. 
 
0. Introduction 
 
Let an agent have precise credences if and only if her doxastic state can be represented by a single 
credence function that assigns numerical values to various propositions. The value that a credence 
function assigns to a proposition reflects the agent’s degree of belief or her confidence in that proposition. 
Though this way of representing doxastic states has several advantages1, many have argued that we ought 
to reject it. Instead, they have proposed an imprecise model of doxastic states: on this picture, an agent’s 
doxastic state is not represented by a single credence function, but rather by a set of credence functions 
called a representor by van Fraassen (1990). This view comes in two varieties. The first is the descriptive 
claim that, given their limited cognitive capacities, human beings like us can’t possibly have precise 
credences.2 The second is the normative claim that there are certain scenarios where agents are permitted 
and required by epistemic rationality not to have precise credences.3  
 
                                               
1 See, e.g., Howson and Urbach (2006), Bovens and Hartmann (2003), and Talbott (2016). 
2 See, e.g., Jeffrey (1983), and van Fraassen (1990). Also, see Pfeifer and Kleiter (2007), Wallsten and Budescu (1995), Smithson 
and Pushkarskaya (forthcoming) for applications of imprecise probabilities to psychology, linguistic processing and neurological 
responses to ambiguity and conflict. 
3 See e.g. Levi (1974,1980, 1985), Walley (1991), Joyce (2005, 2010), Weatherson (ms.), Sturgeon (2008), Hájek & Smithson 
(2012), and Moss (2014). For a survey of some of the different arguments for having imprecise credences, see Bradley (2016).  
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A standard motivation for the second claim comes from cases of nonspecific evidence. Consider 
the following example: 
 
MYSTERY COIN. You have a coin that was made at a factory where they can make coins of pretty 
much any bias. You have no idea whatsoever what bias your coin has. What should your credence 
be that when you toss the coin, it will land heads?4  
 
How should the defender of precise credences answer this question? She could say that you should assign 
a credence of 0.5 to the proposition that the coin will land heads. But some find this answer to be 
problematic. For them, if you were rationally certain that the coin was fair, then you could indeed 
rationally adopt a precise credence of 0.5. Or, if you had precise rational degrees of belief about what the 
possible biases of the coin are, and if the expected chance of the coin landing heads in light of those 
degrees of belief were 0.5, then you could rationally assign a credence of 0.5 to the relevant proposition. 
But in this case, your evidence is non-specific: you have no evidence about the outcome of the coin flip 
other than the evidence that the chance distribution over the two outcomes of the coin flip could be 
anything. In the absence of any specific information whatsoever about the bias of the coin, assigning a 
sharp credence of 0.5 is irrational. For the defender of imprecise credences, non-specific evidence 
warrants non-specific credal states. So, the appropriate doxastic attitude to adopt in this example is a set 
of those credences that are compatible with the possible objective chances of the coin landing heads given 
your evidence.5 This might indeed be the entire unit interval [0,1].  Thus, your doxastic state should be 
representable by a set of credence functions which assign these values to the relevant proposition.  
 
To fix ideas for the purposes of this paper, let an agent’s total evidence with respect to a partition 
X (where a partition is a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions) be non-specific if and only 
if, for some non-singleton set of probability functions C, the only evidence an agent has concerning the 
propositions in X is that the objective chance function for X is in C. Our verdict about MYSTERY COIN 
motivates the following principle. 
  
Requirement of Imprecision. Suppose an agent’s doxastic state is defined over a partition X. If 
the agent’s total evidence is non-specific with respect to X, then the agent is required by epistemic 
rationality to adopt an imprecise credal state with respect to the propositions in X. 
                                               
4 A case like MYSTERY COIN is discussed by Joyce (2010, p. 283); this particular case is discussed by Schoenfield (2015) and Carr 
(2015). 
5 In other words, if, given your evidence, it is possible that the objective chance of the coin landing heads is ¾, then ¾ should be 
in the set of credences that you assign to the proposition that the coin will land heads. 
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Recently, Schoenfield (2015) has given an argument (also presented in a different form by Seidenfeld, 
Schervish, and Kadane (2012) and Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016)) that Requirement of Imprecision 
cannot be reconciled with accuracy-centered epistemology, i.e., the approach to epistemology on which 
requirements of epistemic rationality must be justified by appealing to accuracy-based considerations 
alone. Schoenfield shows that given certain plausible assumptions about measures of accuracy, for any 
imprecise credal state that is defined over a two-cell partition over the possibility space, there is a precise 
credal state that matches it with respect to accuracy. Since an agent cannot be required to have such an 
imprecise credal state from an accuracy-centered standpoint, Requirement of Imprecision is false. 
 
However, Schoenfield’s argument doesn’t rule out the possibility that from an accuracy-centered 
standpoint, (i) in situations of non-specific evidence like MYSTERY COIN, an agent may always be 
rationally permitted to adopt imprecise credal states, and (ii) in some of those cases, at least, she may even 
be rationally required to adopt imprecise credal states. In particular, the following claims might still be 
true: 
  
Permission for Imprecision. Suppose an agent’s doxastic state is defined over a partition X. If 
the agent’s total evidence is nonspecific with respect to X, then the agent is permitted by 
epistemic rationality to adopt an imprecise credal state with respect to the propositions in X. 
  
Weak Requirement of Imprecision. There are some bodies of non-specific evidence E such that 
if an agent’s total evidence is E, then, for some partition X, she is required by epistemic 
rationality to adopt an imprecise credal state with respect to the propositions in X. 
  
Requirement of Imprecision, when combined with other assumptions, entails these claims.6 But these 
claims can also be independently motivated on the basis of cases like MYSTERY COIN. For example, in 
MYSTERY COIN, you cannot be required to adopt any sharp credence about the outcome of the coin flip. In 
particular, since all that you know is that the objective chance of heads coming up is in the set [0,1], it is 
permissible for you to make an imprecise credal assignment of [0,1] to the proposition that the coin will 
land heads. This consideration supports Permission for Imprecision. Moreover, under ordinary 
circumstances, our attitudes are defined over sets of propositions much more complex than a two-cell 
                                               
6 Permission for Imprecision follows from Requirement of Imprecision when we assume that any credal state that is rationally 
required must also be rationally permissible. Weak Requirement of Imprecision follows when we assume that there are some 
sets of propositions X, with respect to which an agent can have the relevant kind of non-specific evidence. 
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partition of the possibility space. If we intuitively understand MYSTERY COIN as a case of that sort, then 
we may indeed be correct in thinking that there is a rational requirement to adopt an imprecise credal state 
in this scenario. This supports Weak Requirement of Imprecision. 
  
In this essay, we argue that the defender of imprecise credences cannot easily reconcile Weak 
Requirement of Imprecision and Permission for Imprecision with accuracy-centered epistemology. 
We show that the following two claims come out true given certain constraints on measures of accuracy: 
(i) for any imprecise credal state, there is a precise credal state that is just as accurate, and (ii) many 
imprecise credal states that are predicted to be rational by a natural precisification of Permission for 
Imprecision are in fact accuracy-dominated by precise credal states, i.e., guaranteed to do worse 
accuracy-wise than some precise credal states. If (i) is true, Weak Requirement of Imprecision cannot 
be accommodated within accuracy-centered epistemology; if (ii) is true, there will be a tension between 
Permission for Imprecision and accuracy-centered epistemology. Since the constraints we impose on 
measures of accuracy are not easy to reject, we end up with the conclusion that there is no easy way of 
accommodating the rationality of imprecise credences within an accuracy-centered approach to 
epistemology. 
  
Here is how we shall proceed. First, we will present Schoenfield’s argument against 
Requirement of Imprecision (§1). Then, we will show how her argument fails to rule out the possibility 
that the accuracy-centered epistemologist can accommodate Weak Requirement of Imprecision and 
Permission for Imprecision (§2). Then, we will show that given certain plausible constraints on 
measures of accuracy, we cannot easily reconcile these two theses with accuracy-centered epistemology 
(§3-4). Next, we shall consider three responses to this argument, all of which involve rejecting one or 
more of these constraints on measures of accuracy (§§5-7). We go on to argue that none of these 
responses can easily succeed. 
 
1. Accuracy and Credal Imprecision 
 
In this section, we introduce accuracy-centered epistemology, and present an argument given by 
Schoenfield (2015) that makes trouble for Requirement of Imprecision. 
 
1.1 Accuracy-Centered Epistemology  
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Accuracy-centered epistemology is a species of epistemic utility theory. Epistemic utility theory has two 
aims. On the one hand, it seeks to articulate a conception of epistemic value that explains what makes one 
doxastic state more valuable from an epistemic standpoint than another. On the other hand, it seeks to 
explain why certain requirements of epistemic rationality have the force that they have, by showing that 
conforming to them is the best means towards promoting the relevant kind of epistemic value.  
 
Accuracy-centered epistemologists think that the only source of epistemic value for credal states 
(i.e., doxastic states representable by credence functions or sets of credence functions) is the gradational 
accuracy of the credences they involve, i.e., their proximity to the truth.7 This view is sometimes called 
Credal Veritism. For example, the epistemic value of a doxastic state that is representable by a single 
credence function will depend on the gradational accuracy of the credences it assigns to various 
propositions, where the gradational accuracy of a credence in a true proposition is higher when the 
credence is closer to 1, while the gradational accuracy of a credence in a false proposition is higher when 
the credence is closer to 0. Using this conception of epistemic value, accuracy-centered epistemologists 
argue that various epistemic norms, such as Probabilism (i.e., the norm of having probabilistically 
coherent credences) and Conditionalization (the norm of adopting as posteriors one’s prior conditional 
probabilities), can be shown to cohere with the instrumentally rational pursuit of accuracy.8 That explains 
why these norms have the force that they seem to have. 
 
Accuracy-centered epistemologists assess the accuracy of precise credal states (i.e., doxastic 
states representable by single credence functions) using measures of accuracy. Suppose W is a set of 
worlds, such that any set P of worlds in W is a proposition. Let X = {P1, P2, P3,...} be a partition over W, 
where each cell Pi in X is a proposition. Let BX be the set of all credence functions defined over X.9 The 
accuracy of a credence function b in BX is measured by a precise global accuracy measure GX: BX  x W → 
[0,1], which maps a credence function b in BX and a world w in W to a real value GX(b,w) between 0 and 
1. 
 
There is a lot of discussion in the literature about which measures of accuracy are best suited to 
assess the accuracy of an agent’s credal state. Instead of engaging in any such discussion, we will take the 
                                               
7 See, e.g., Joyce (2009) and Pettigrew (2016). 
8 For accuracy-based arguments for Probabilism, see Joyce (1998, 2009), Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010), and Pettigrew (2016). 
For arguments for Conditionalization, see Greaves and Wallace (2006), Easwaran (2013), and Briggs and Pettigrew 
(forthcoming). 
9 A credence function defined over a partition X on W will assign a real number between 0 and 1 (inclusive) to every cell of W. A 
probability function defined over a partition X is a credence function defined over X such that the values it assigns to the cells in 
X sum to 1. 
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following three properties of global accuracy measures for granted. Relative to any partition X over a set 
of worlds W, if GX is a legitimate global accuracy measure for credence functions defined over X, then 
 
1.  Upper Bound. For any w in W and any proposition P in X, if w is in P, then GX will assign 
the maximal accuracy score of 1 to any credence function b that assigns 1 to P and 0 to every 
other proposition in X.  
 
2.  Lower Bound. For any w in W and any proposition P in X, if w is in P, then GX will assign 
the minimal accuracy score of 0 to any credence function b that assigns 0 to P and 1 to every 
other proposition in X. 
 
3. Continuity. GX will be continuous through the space of probability functions, in the sense 
that, for any w in W, small differences in credence functions defined over X should result in 
small differences in the accuracy score of those credence functions in w.  
 
1.2 Measuring the Accuracy of Imprecise Credal States 
 
This framework is only suitable for measuring the accuracy of precise credal states. How do we, then, 
measure the accuracy of imprecise credal states, i.e., doxastic states that aren’t representable by single 
credence functions? The answer is simple: we introduce global accuracy measures that take as input not 
individual credence functions, but rather sets of credence functions. In other words, we define a new 
imprecise global accuracy measure GX*:  ℘(BX) x W → [0,1] (where ℘(BX) is the power set of BX) which 
takes a set of credence functions C and a world w in W as input and outputs an accuracy score GX*(C, w).  
 
Schoenfield (2015) proposes three constraints that such imprecise accuracy measures should 
satisfy, and we add a fourth to make her argument work within our framework. 
 
The first constraint is:  
 
Extension. For any set of worlds W and a partition X over W, if GX* is a legitimate 
imprecise global accuracy measure for sets of credence functions defined over X, then 
there exists a legitimate global accuracy measure GX for credence functions such that GX* 
is an extension of GX.  
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In other words, for any b in BX, the accuracy score that GX* assigns to the singleton set 
{b} in a world w is the same as the accuracy score that GX assigns to b in w: i.e., 
GX*({b},w) = GX(b,w).  
 
Extension is motivated by the idea that if a method of measuring the accuracy of imprecise credal states 
is to be legitimate, it should be consistent with at least one legitimate way of measuring the accuracy of 
precise credal states.  
 
The second constraint is: 
 
Boundedness. For any set of worlds W and a partition X over W, if GX* is a legitimate 
imprecise global accuracy measure for sets of credence functions defined over X, then 
GX* always assigns a real value between 0 and 1 (inclusive).  
 
In particular, for any w in W and any b in BX,  
 
(i) GX*({b},w) = 1 iff for any P in X, (i) if w is in P, then b(P)=1 and (ii) if w is not 
in P, then b(P)=0.  
(ii) GX*({b},w)= 0 iff for any P in X, (i) if w is in P, then b(P)=0 and (ii) if w is not 
in P, then b(P)=1.  
 
Boundedness is motivated by two ideas. The first is the idea that, just like legitimate global accuracy 
measures for precise credences, legitimate imprecise accuracy measures must also output real values; 
otherwise, given Extension, it will be difficult to compare the accuracy of imprecise credal states with 
precise ones. The second is the idea that, even for imprecise credal states, there seems to be a maximally 
accurate credal state and a minimally accurate credal state for every possible world. The maximally 
accurate one is the one that assigns credence 1 to all those propositions that are true in that world and 0 to 
all those propositions that are false in that world, while the minimally accurate one is the one that assigns 
credence 1 to all those propositions that are false in that world and 0 to all those propositions that are true 
in that world. 
 
The third constraint is:  
 
 8 
Probabilistic Admissibility. For any set of worlds W and a partition X over W, if GX* is 
a legitimate imprecise global accuracy measure for sets of credence functions defined 
over X, then for any set C of probability functions in BX, there is no set C* of credence 
functions in BX such that C is weakly accuracy-dominated by C* according to GX*.  
 
In other words, there is no set C* in BX such that 
(i) for every world w in W, GX*(C,w) ≤ GX*(C*,w), and  
(ii) there exists a world w in W such that GX*(C,w) < GX*(C*,w).10  
 
Probabilistic Admissibility captures the thought that a legitimate global measure of accuracy shouldn’t 
allow a probabilistic credal state to be weakly accuracy-dominated by other credal states. One reason for 
this is that, intuitively, for every probabilistic credal state, an agent could have some body of evidence 
that would make it rationally permissible for her to have that credal state. For example, for any set of 
probability functions C defined over a partition X, she could always get evidence that the objective chance 
distribution over X lies in that set C. Then, provided she has no further information about the propositions 
in X, it would be rationally permissible for the agent to adopt C as her imprecise credal state. But, if C is 
weakly accuracy-dominated by some other set C*, then, from an accuracy-centered standpoint, it would 
be rationally impermissible for an agent to adopt it.11 
 
The final constraint (which we need to prove Schoenfield’s result within our framework) is:  
 
                                               
10 Joyce (2009) defends a restricted version of Probabilistic Admissibility for precise probability functions under the label of 
Coherent Admissibility.  
11 One assumption of this argument is that if a credal state is weakly accuracy-dominated, then it cannot be rationally permissible 
for an agent to adopt it. Some writers such as Pettigrew (2013) deny this assumption: they argue that we aren’t rationally required 
to avoid dominated options, but rather options that are dominated by non-dominated options. This is what Pettigrew calls 
Undominated Dominance. Even though our present argument for Probabilistic Admissibility doesn’t straightforwardly 
succeed with Undominated Dominance, we can still construct a slightly more fleshed out argument that is compatible with this 
principle. It goes like this. 
Suppose a probabilistic credal state represented by a set of probability functions C is weakly accuracy-dominated by 
another credal state represented by a set of credence functions C*. Also, suppose the state represented by C is rationally 
permissible, because the only evidence that the agent has regarding the relevant partition is that the objective chance function for 
the relevant partition could be any of the probability functions belonging to C. Note that the following principle seems to be true: 
if a credal state C is rationally permissible, and C* weakly accuracy-dominates C, then C* is rationally permissible. Now, either 
the state represented by C* is probabilistic or it’s not. If it is non-probabilistic, then the principle in question yields the conclusion 
that the credal state represented by C* is rationally permissible in some situation despite being non-probabilistic. This is a bad 
result. Moreover, even if the state represented by C* is probabilistic, then there is no reason why C* must be rationally 
permissible. For there might be some objective chance distribution p in C* which the agent’s evidence rules out, or there might 
be some chance distribution p which C* doesn’t contain but the agent’s evidence doesn’t rule out. In either case, intuitively, the 
credal state given by C* will be rationally impermissible for the agent to adopt. But note that one of these possibilities has to be 
true if C* is distinct from C. Therefore, if C represents a probabilistic credal state, it cannot be weakly accuracy-dominated by 
another state represented by C* (whether or not that latter state is itself dominated). 
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World-Invariance. For any set of worlds W and a partition X over W, if GX* is a 
legitimate imprecise global accuracy measure for sets of credence functions defined over 
X, then for any two worlds w and w*, if w and w* are in the same cell of the partition X, 
then, for any set C of credence functions in BX, GX(C, w) = GX(C, w*).12 
 
World-Invariance says that if two worlds w and w* assign the same truth-values to the same 
propositions in a partition, then a credal state defined over that partition should have the same accuracy 
score in the two worlds. In other words, the accuracy of a credal state depends completely on the truth-
values of the propositions that it is defined over: the accuracy score of the same credal state shouldn’t 
differ from one world to another unless the worlds assign different truth-values to the propositions over 
which the credal state is defined.  
 
1.3 Schoenfield’s Result 
 
Schoenfield (2015) begins with a principle about epistemic rationality that seems to fall out of accuracy-
centered epistemology. Credal Veritists are committed to the thesis that gradational accuracy is the only 
source of epistemic value for credal states. Most of them also assume that an agent can be required by 
epistemic rationality to adopt a credal state D rather than a credal state D* only if D gives the agent a 
better shot at having accurate credences than D*. Thus, they are committed to the following principle: 
 
The Permission Principle. For any credal state D, if, according to every legitimate global 
accuracy measure, there exists a credal state D* that is no less accurate than D in every 
(epistemically) possible world, then there can be no rational requirement to adopt D.13 
 
Schoenfield shows that if we accept the Permission Principle, we must give up Requirement of 
Imprecision.  
 
In particular, she proves the following claim. 
 
                                               
12 Schoenfield doesn’t use World-Invariance in her proof, because she doesn’t make the distinction between the set of worlds W 
and the partition X over that set. As a result, she does not evaluate the accuracy of credence functions or sets of credence 
functions at worlds in W, but rather at propositions within the relevant partition X. Since we do not do this, we need World-
Invariance in order to reconstruct her proof of Proposition 1. 
13 Schoenfield (2015, p. 5). This constraint is also subject to an objection similar to the Bronfman objection to the Non-
Dominance Principle that we discuss later. See footnote 20. 
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Proposition 1. For any set of worlds W and a two-cell partition X over W, let C be a set of 
probability functions in BX (the set of credence functions defined over X). If Extension, 
Boundedness, Probabilistic Admissibility, and World-Invariance are true, then, for any 
legitimate imprecise global accuracy measure GX*, there will be a probability function b in BX 
such that, for any w in W,  GX*(C,w) = GX*({b}, w).14 
 
If we grant that Extension, Boundedness, Probabilistic Admissibility, and World-Invariance are 
correct, then Schoenfield has shown us that, for any imprecise credal state defined over a two-cell 
partition of the possibility space, there is a precise credal state which matches it with respect to accuracy.  
 
To illustrate the main idea behind the proof, consider the case of MYSTERY COIN.  In that 
example, there are just two propositions we care about: the proposition H (i.e., the set of worlds where the 
coin lands heads) and the proposition T (i.e., the set of worlds where the coin lands tails). So {H, T} is the 
two-cell partition (over a set of worlds W) over which the agent’s credal state is defined. Now, the 
defender of Requirement of Imprecision may be committed to thinking that in MYSTERY COIN, an agent 
who has no evidence about the bias of the coin is required to have an imprecise probabilistic credal state 
over {H, T}. Let this imprecise probabilistic credal state be represented by a set of probability functions 
C. Schoenfield then shows that there is a precise probability function b that is just as accurate as C in 
every world. Her argument goes like this. Let GX* be any legitimate imprecise global accuracy measure 
and let GX*(C,wh)=r for any wh in H. By Boundedness, Extension, and Continuity, we can show that 
there is a singleton set of a probability function {b} such that GX*({b},wh)=r for all wh in H. So, {b} is just 
as accurate as C in every H-world according to GX*. But then {b} will also have to be as accurate as C in 
every T-world wt according to GX*. Otherwise, either {b} or C will (weakly) accuracy-dominate the other 
and thereby violate Probabilistic Admissibility. But, then, since {H,T} is a partition, {b} is just as 
accurate as C in every world according to GX*. 
 
What Proposition 1 shows is that provided we accept the relevant constraints on global accuracy 
measures for imprecise credences, for any imprecise probabilistic credal state defined over {H, T}, there 
is a precise probabilistic credal state which is just as accurate as the imprecise one. So, by the Permission 
Principle, the agent cannot rationally be required to adopt the imprecise doxastic state in that scenario. 
Hence, Requirement of Imprecision is false. 
 
                                               
14 The proof of Proposition 1, along with all other proofs, is given in the appendix. 
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Proposition 1 might also lead to a tension between Requirement of Imprecision and accuracy-
centered epistemology in another way. Many authors accept the following constraint on global accuracy 
measures. 
 
Strict Immodesty. If a rational agent assesses the epistemic value of various credal states in light 
of her own credal state according to a legitimate global accuracy measure, she should come to 
regard her own credal state as uniquely optimal, or as giving her the uniquely best shot at having 
accurate doxastic states. 
 
The main idea behind Strict Immodesty is that a rational agent takes her doxastic state to be better than 
all others from an epistemic standpoint. When we are concerned solely about precise credal states, Strict 
Immodesty is sometimes spelled out as the requirement of strict propriety on precise global accuracy 
measures: any legitimate precise global accuracy measure GX must be such that, for any probability 
function p defined over X, the expected accuracy of p according to p itself should be greater than the 
expected accuracy of any other credence function b according to p.15 
 
Proposition 1 demonstrates that no legitimate accuracy measure for imprecise credences can 
satisfy Extension, Boundedness, Probabilistic Admissibility, World-Invariance, and Strict 
Immodesty: if Extension, Boundedness, Probabilistic Admissibility, World-Invariance are correct, 
then an agent who has an imprecise credal state defined over a two-cell partition will find another precise 
doxastic state to be just as accurate as her own at every world. According to Strict Immodesty, such an 
agent cannot be rational. If we want to accommodate Strict Immodesty (as well as these other constraints 
on measures of accuracy) and assume that epistemic rationality does not lay down conflicting 
requirements, we should reject the idea that an agent can be required (or even permitted) by epistemic 
rationality to have imprecise doxastic states defined over two-cell partitions over the possibility space. 
Thus, Requirement of Imprecision must be false. Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (2012) and Mayo-
Wilson and Wheeler (2016) prove similar results with slightly different assumptions for agents who only 
have doxastic attitudes towards one proposition.  
 
 
2. Responses 
                                               
15 Joyce (2009) explicitly defends Strict Immodesty as a desirable property of global measures of accuracy for precise credal 
states. See also Oddie (1997), Greaves and Wallace (2006), and Gibbard (2008). 
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In conjunction with the Permission Principle or Strict Immodesty, Schoenfield’s result entails that, 
given certain plausible constraints on measures of accuracy, an accuracy-centered epistemologist cannot 
accept Requirement of Imprecision. In this section, we show that Schoenfield’s result fails to rule out 
Weak Requirement of Imprecision and Permission for Imprecision. 
 
2.1 Weak Requirement of Imprecision 
  
It is hard to miss a certain feature of Schoenfield’s result: it deals with a scenario where an agent’s 
doxastic state only assigns credences to two propositions. This makes it difficult to see how it bears on 
versions of MYSTERY COIN where an agent has doxastic attitudes not only towards the two possible 
outcomes of the coin flip, but also towards other propositions. Consider a version of the scenario where 
the agent additionally has doxastic attitudes towards propositions about the chances of the two outcomes. 
In fact, one might think that this indeed is the more accurate description of the case: it is because the 
agent cannot really form any precise opinion about the bias of the coin that she cannot form a precise 
degree of belief about the outcomes of the coin flip. Therefore, her doxastic attitudes toward the chance-
propositions are relevant to her doxastic attitudes regarding the outcomes of the coin flip. 
 
Now, it is by no means obvious that Schoenfield’s proof can be generalized to such examples. 
The proof crucially relies on the premise that for two sets of probability functions C and C*, if, for any 
heads-world wh, C and C* are equally accurate in wh, then, for any tails-world wt, C and C* also have to 
be equally accurate in wt (or else either C or C* would be weakly accuracy-dominated). In other words, 
for any heads-world wh and any tails-world wt, if GX*(C,wh) = GX*(C*,wh), then GX*(C,wt) = GX*(C*,wt). 
But in a scenario where an agent also has beliefs about the bias of the coin, let the partition be {FH, FT, 
BH, BT}, where FH and FT together include all and only those worlds where the coin is fair, while BH 
and BT include all and only those worlds where it is biased towards heads or tails. Now, the mere fact 
that, for any FH-world wfh, GX*(C,wfh) = GX*(C*,wfh), implies nothing about how C  and C* should score 
in worlds where FH isn’t true. It is, for example, perfectly plausible that, for some FT-world wft, 
GX*(C,wft) > GX*(C*,wft) , as long as C does worse than C* in some of the worlds where BH or BT are 
true. Therefore, Schoenfield’s argument does not by itself show that there cannot be any accuracy-related 
reasons to adopt an imprecise doxastic state in cases where our doxastic states are defined over a more 
finely grained partition over the set of possible worlds  (which we take it happens all the time). 
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Hence, the defender of imprecise credences may bite the bullet on the case that Schoenfield’s 
proof deals with, and say that in cases where an agent’s doxastic state is defined over a two-cell partition, 
the agent isn’t rationally required to adopt imprecise credences. However, she might insist that there are 
other cases where an agent whose credal state is defined over a more complex partition is required by 
epistemic rationality to adopt imprecise credences. Hence, even if the Permission Principle is correct, 
Weak Requirement of Imprecision can still be true with respect to imprecise credal states defined over 
partitions with more than two cells. This is significant: since, ordinarily, our doxastic states are defined 
over such complex partitions, we may think that, when saddled with non-specific evidence of the relevant 
kind, we are often required by epistemic rationality to have imprecise credences. 
 
2.2 Permission for Imprecision 
  
Now, one might point out that even though Schoenfield’s argument (when combined with the Permission 
Principle) doesn’t rule out Weak Requirement of Imprecision, it does create trouble Permission for 
Imprecision when combined with Strict Immodesty. For the argument predicts that in a case like 
MYSTERY COIN where the agent has non-specific evidence and adopts a credal state defined over a two-
cell partition, if the credal state in question is imprecise, the agent will violate the requirement laid down 
by Strict Immodesty. But if Permission for Imprecision is correct, then it is indeed rationally 
permissible for the agent to adopt an imprecise credal state under such circumstances. So, there is a 
conflict between what Permission for Imprecision allows and what Strict Immodesty requires. Hence, 
if we accept Strict Immodesty, we would have to say that Permission for Imprecision is false. But 
intuitively, it seems that, given how limited her information about the bias of the coin is, the agent 
wouldn’t be violating any requirement of rationality if she were to adopt an imprecise credal state in that 
scenario! 
 
However, the argument from Strict Immodesty isn’t persuasive. As Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler 
(2016) note, the traditional justification for Strict Immodesty, due to de Finetti (1937), is that accuracy 
measures that satisfy Strict Immodesty are pragmatically valuable to the inquirer: if a rational agent 
estimates the value of her doxastic state according to a strictly immodest measure of accuracy, she will 
always prefer to report her actual doxastic state rather than some other state (because she expects it to lead 
to the best results).  This pragmatic justification may not be convincing to someone who wants to know 
why from a purely epistemic standpoint a rational agent should use strictly immodest measures of 
accuracy. The other philosophical motivation that Joyce (2009) mentions for Strict Immodesty is that 
violations of this constraint give rise to Moore-paradoxical situations in which an agent adopts a certain 
 14 
doxastic state but thinks some other doxastic state would be better from an epistemic standpoint. But this 
only motivates a weaker requirement: 
 
Mild Immodesty. If a rational agent assesses the epistemic value of various credal states in light 
of her own credal state according to a legitimate global accuracy measure, she shouldn’t come to 
regard her own credal state as suboptimal, or as giving her a worse shot at having accurate 
doxastic states, in comparison with other doxastic states.  
 
Now, note that Mild Immodesty, when combined with Proposition 1 and the other constraints on global 
measures of accuracy, doesn’t predict that it is rationally impermissible for the agent to adopt an 
imprecise credal state with respect to a two-cell partition. In a case where an agent adopts an imprecise 
credal state with respect to a two-cell partition, if the agent measures the accuracy of doxastic states 
according to a mildly immodest measure of accuracy, she will think that her imprecise credal state is just 
as good as another precise credal state, but won’t think it is worse than the precise credal state. So, it may 
indeed be rationally permissible to have that imprecise credal state. Thus, Permission for Imprecision 
can still be true. This, in turn, may help us preserve the intuition that in a case like MYSTERY COIN where 
our evidence is non-specific, we aren’t doing anything rationally impermissible in adopting imprecise 
credences. 
 
In this section, we have shown that even though Schoenfield’s argument rules out Requirement of 
Imprecision, it leaves open the possibility that an accuracy-centered epistemologist can accept Weak 
Requirement of Imprecision and Permission for Imprecision. In the next part of this essay, we offer a 
new argument to show that given certain plausible constraints on measures of accuracy, Weak 
Requirement of Imprecision and Permission for Imprecision cannot be reconciled with accuracy-
centered epistemology. 
  
3. Local Accuracy Measures 
 
Before we offer our argument, we need some additional assumptions. In particular we think that it is 
important to pay special attention to the distinction between local measures of accuracy (the measures of 
accuracy for credal assignments that an agent makes to individual propositions) and global measures of 
accuracy (i.e., the measures of accuracy for entire credal states), and the idea that there has to be some 
connection between the two.  
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3.1 Measuring the Local Accuracy of Precise Credal Assignments 
 
Recall our earlier definition of global accuracy measures for precise credal states. Given a partition X over 
a set of worlds W, a global accuracy measure GX takes as input any credence function b defined over X 
and a world w, and outputs the accuracy score of b in w. Standardly, the global accuracy of a credence 
function b in a world w is thought to depend on the accuracy score of the credence that it assigns to each 
proposition P in the partition X. To measure the accuracy score of each credal assignment to a 
proposition, we need local measures of accuracy. 
 
In order to define local measures of accuracy, we need another notion. For any world w in a set of 
worlds W, let an alethic vindication function vw: ℘(W) → {0, 1} be a function from a proposition P to 0 
and 1 such that, for any proposition P, vw(P) = 1 iff w is in P and vw(P) = 0 iff w is not in P. Intuitively, 
the alethic vindication function outputs the truth-value of a proposition at a particular world. If the world 
belongs to a proposition, then the proposition is true, and therefore the truth-value is represented by 1. If 
the world doesn’t belong to a proposition, the proposition is false, and therefore the truth-value is 
represented by 0.  
 
Now, we can say what local measures of accuracy are. A precise local measure of accuracy L: 
[0,1] x {0,1} → [0,1] takes as input (i) any credence b(P) assigned to a proposition P and (ii) the truth-
value of P at a world w, given by vw(P). It then outputs a real value L(b(P), vw(P)) between 0 and 1. If we 
evaluate b(P) at a world w where P is true, the local accuracy of b(P) in that state is given by L(b(P),1) 
(since w is in P). If we evaluate b(P) at some other world w* where P is false, the local accuracy of b(p) 
in that state will be given by L(b(p),0) (since w is not in P).  
 
We shall assume that precise local measures of accuracy are subject to the following constraints. 
If L is a legitimate local measure of accuracy, then 
 
1. Upper Bound. If a proposition P is true (/false), then a credal assignment of 1 (/0) to P should 
have the maximal accuracy score of 1. In other words, L(1,1)=L(0,0)=1. 
 
2. Lower Bound. If a proposition P is true (/false), then a credal assignment of 0 (/1) to P should 
have the minimal accuracy score of 0. In other words, L(0,1)=L(1,0)=0. 
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3.  Continuity. The functions L(.,0) and L(.,1) are continuous through the unit interval [0,1], in the 
sense that small differences in the inputs to these functions should result in small differences in 
their outputs. 
 
4. Truth-Directedness. For any precise credal assignments r1 and r2 in [0,1],  
(i) If |1-r1|<|1-r2|, then L(r1, 1)>L(r2, 1), and  
(ii) If |0-r1|<|0-r2|, then L(r1, 0)>L(r2, 0).16 
 
Here, Upper Bound, Lower Bound, and Continuity are similar to the constraints we imposed on 
legitimate global measures of accuracy. Truth-Directedness captures the natural thought that, from an 
accuracy-centered standpoint, if one credence r1 is closer to the actual truth-value of a proposition than 
another credence r2, then r1 should have a better accuracy score than r2. 
 
3.2 Measuring the Local Accuracy of Imprecise Credal Assignments 
 
Next, we define local accuracy measures for imprecise credal assignments. An imprecise local accuracy 
measure L*: ℘([0,1]) x {0,1} → [0,1] is a function that maps a set of credences assigned to a proposition 
and the truth-value of that proposition to a number between 0 and 1. Suppose we are dealing with an 
imprecise credal state defined over a partition X over the set of worlds W. Suppose this credal state is 
represented by a set of credence functions C. Then, for any proposition P in X, let the set of credences that 
this credal state assigns to P be C(P) = {b(P): b ∈ C}.  So, the local accuracy of C(P) in a world w will be 
L*(C(P),vw(P)). 
 
We impose the following constraints on imprecise local accuracy measures. 
 
Local Extension. If L* is a legitimate imprecise local accuracy measure, then there exists a 
legitimate precise local accuracy measure L such that L* is an extension of L. 
 
In other words, for any real number r between 0 and 1 and any truth-value v, L*({r}, v) = 
L(r,v). 
 
                                               
16 This version of Truth-Directedness is also accepted by other authors, such as Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016) .  
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Like Extension, Local Extension is motivated by the idea that local accuracy measures for imprecise 
credal assignments should be consistent with the manner in which we measure the accuracy of precise 
credal assignments. 
 
The second constraint is: 
 
Local Boundedness.  If L* is a legitimate imprecise local accuracy measure, then it only 
assigns real values between 0 and 1 (inclusive).  
 
In particular, for any set of credences R,  
(i) L*(R, 0)= 1 iff R={0} and  L*(R,1) = 1 iff R={1}.  
(ii) L*(R, 0)= 0 iff R={1} and  L*(R,1) = 0 iff R={0}. 
 
Like Boundedness, Local Boundedness is motivated by two ideas.  The first is the idea that, just like 
legitimate local accuracy measures for precise credences, legitimate local imprecise accuracy measures 
must also output real values; otherwise, given Local Extension, it will be difficult to compare the 
accuracy of imprecise credal assignments with precise ones. The second idea is that, even for imprecise 
credal assignments, there seems to be a maximally accurate credal assignment and a minimally accurate 
credal assignment for every proposition given its actual truth-value. When the proposition is true, the 
credal assignment that has maximal accuracy is the one that assigns a precise credence of 1 (here 
represented as {1}) and the credal assignment that has minimal accuracy is the one that assigns a precise 
credence of 0 (here represented as {0}). When the proposition is false, the credal assignment that has 
maximal accuracy is the one that assigns a precise credence of 0 and the credal assignment that has 
minimal accuracy is the one that assigns a precise credence of 1. 
 
The third constraint is:  
Local Admissibility. If L* is a legitimate imprecise local accuracy measure, then for two sets of 
credences R and R*, R* doesn’t strongly accuracy-dominate R, i.e., it is not the case that L*(R, 
0)<L*(R*, 0) and L*(R, 1)<L*(R*, 1). 
Just as Probabilistic Admissibility rules out the possibility that one probabilistic credal state can weakly 
accuracy-dominate another, Local Admissibility rules out the possibility that one credal assignment 
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might strongly accuracy-dominate another.17 The motivating intuition here is (roughly) that violations of 
Local Admissibility will lead to violations of Probabilistic Admissibility simpliciter. Consider a set of 
probability functions C defined over a partition X, which contains a proposition P such that C(P)=R. 
Suppose, contrary to Local Admissibility, some R* strongly accuracy-dominates R given some local 
measure of accuracy L*. Then we can construct another set of credence functions C* such that, for any 
proposition P* in X other than P, C*(P*)=C(P*), but C*(P)=R*. In any world, for any proposition P* 
other than P, the local accuracy of the credal assignments made by C* will be the same as the local 
accuracy of the credal assignments made by C, but the local accuracy of the credal assignment made by 
C* to P will always be greater than that made by C to P. But then, intuitively, it seems that the global 
accuracy of C* must be greater than that of C in every world.18 So, C* will accuracy-dominate C. Since C 
is a set of probability functions, this will lead to a violation of Probabilistic Admissibility.  Thus, in 
order to avoid violations of Probabilistic Admissibility we need to rule out the possibility that some 
credal assignments R can be locally accuracy dominated. 
 
The fourth, and most crucial, constraint, is: 
 
Local-Global Connection. Suppose X is a partition over a set of worlds W.  Then,  
 
(i) For any legitimate imprecise global measure of accuracy GX*, there exists a legitimate 
imprecise local measure of accuracy L* such that for any two sets C and C* of credence 
functions defined over X, and any world w in W, if L*(C(P),vw(P)) = L*(C*(P),vw(P)) for 
every proposition P in X, then GX*(C,w) = GX*(C*,w). 
 
(ii) For any legitimate imprecise local measure of accuracy L*, there exists a legitimate 
imprecise global measure of accuracy GX*, such that for any two sets C and C* of credence 
functions defined over X, and any world w in W, if L*(C(P),vw(P)) = L*(C*(P),vw(P)) for 
every proposition P in X, then GX*(C,w) = GX*(C*,w). 
                                               
17 Note that Local Admissibility could be strengthened by making the relevant kind of dominance weak dominance but we only 
need this weaker constraint. 
18 The reasoning here importantly presupposes a principle similar to the constraint called Local-Global Connection that we 
discuss below. According to this principle, for any legitimate imprecise local measure of accuracy L*, there exists a legitimate 
imprecise global measure of accuracy GX*, such that for any two sets C and C* of credence functions defined over X, and any 
world w in W, if L*(C(P),vw(P)) ≥ L*(C*(P),vw(P)) for every proposition P in X and L*(C(P*),vw(P*))>L*(C*(P*),vw(P*)) for 
some proposition P* in X, then GX*(C,w)>GX*(C*,w). This principle is motivated by the same considerations that motivate 
Local-Global Connection, and we think that everything that we say in defense of Local-Global Connection in this section and 
§7 will equally apply to this principle. So, anyone who accepts Local-Global Connection should also be fine with this variant. 
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Most accuracy-centered epistemologists also accept a version of Local-Global Connection restricted to 
precise credences. 19 Local-Global Connection arises out of the important thought that the global 
accuracy score of an entire credal state should depend solely on the accuracy scores of the particular 
credal assignments that it makes to various propositions. We want to leave it open precisely how the 
global accuracy score arises from the local ones, and only impose two weak constraints by means of 
Local-Global Connection. Constraint (i) says that for any legitimate global accuracy measure, there 
exists a legitimate local accuracy measure such that if two credal states make equally accurate credal 
assignments to each proposition in a partition according to the local measure, then the global accuracy of 
the two states is the same according to the global measure. By contrast, (ii) says that for any legitimate 
local accuracy measure, there exists a legitimate global accuracy measure, such that if two credal states 
make equally accurate credal assignments to each proposition in a partition according to the local 
measure, then the global accuracy of the two states is the same according to the global measure. 
 
Local Extension, Local Boundedness, Local Admissibility, and Local-Global Connection are 
the four constraints on measures of accuracy for imprecise credences that we need to generalize 
Schoenfield’s argument. 
 
4. The Two Results 
 
In §2, we saw that Schoenfield’s argument against Requirement of Imprecision is not decisive: it leaves 
open the possibility that some weaker principles such as Permission for Imprecision or Weak 
Requirement of Imprecision might still be true. We now show that if we pay close attention to the 
connection between local and global accuracy measures, these weaker principles won’t succeed either. 
We prove two results in this section. The first is directed towards Weak Requirement of Imprecision 
and generalizes Schoenfield’s proof to partitions of any number of cells. The second is directed towards 
Permission for Imprecision, which shows that some imprecise credal states, which are predicted to be 
rational by a natural precisification of Permission for Imprecision, will always be accuracy-dominated. 
  
4.1 The First Result 
                                               
19 For example, Pettigrew (2016) defends a principle called Additivity, and Joyce (2009) endorses a principle called 
Separability, both of which entail (i). However, an advantage of the Local-Global Connection over Additivity and 
Separability is that the latter two constraints entail that accuracy is not a dependent good, i.e., the manner in which a particular 
credence in a particular proposition contributes to the accuracy of the agent’s total doxastic state doesn’t depend on what other 
credences she has in other propositions. But Local-Global Connection doesn’t require us to accept anything as strong as that. 
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We can now show that the following claim is true:  
 
Proposition 2. Suppose an imprecise credal state defined over a partition X over a set of worlds 
W is represented by a set C of functions in BX. If Local Extension, Local Boundedness, Local 
Admissibility, and Local-Global Connection are true, then there will be a credence function b in 
BX such that for any legitimate imprecise global measure of accuracy GX*, GX*(C,w) = 
GX*({b},w) in every world w.  
 
Proposition 2 shows that, according to certain plausible measures of accuracy, for any imprecise credal 
state, there will be a precise credal state which is just as accurate as that state. This result is simply a 
generalization of Schoenfield’s argument. Schoenfield shows that for any imprecise probabilistic credal 
state defined over a two-cell partition, there is a precise probabilistic credal state that is just as accurate. 
We have shown that, given our constraints, this isn’t just true for probabilistic imprecise credal states 
defined over two-cell partitions, but for all imprecise credal states defined over partitions with any 
number of cells. 
 
If we accept the Permission Principle, Local Extension, Local Boundedness, Local-Global 
Connection, and Local Admissibility, we will end up with the result that there are no circumstances 
under which an agent is rationally required to have an imprecise credal state. Hence, this shows that if the 
Permission Principle is true, then Weak Requirement of Imprecision cannot be true: there is no body 
of evidence E such that an agent is rationally required to adopt an imprecise credal state in response to E.  
 
However, one might think that this result still leaves open the possibility that there are scenarios 
like MYSTERY COIN, where the non-specificity of the agent’s evidence at least makes it rationally 
permissible for her to adopt imprecise credences. In other words, this result remains compatible with 
Permission for Imprecision. 
4.2 The Second Result 
  
We will now show that, given our constraints on measures of accuracy, Permission for Imprecision is 
problematic as well. According to Permission for Imprecision, if an agent’s total evidence is nonspecific 
with respect to a partition X, then the agent is permitted by epistemic rationality to adopt an imprecise 
credal state. Recall that an agent’s total evidence with respect to a partition X is non-specific if and only 
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if, for some non-singleton set of probability functions C, the only evidence an agent has concerning the 
propositions in X is that the objective chance function for X is in C. In a case where an agent’s total 
evidence is non-specific in this sense, what imprecise credal state is the agent rationally permitted to 
adopt? The most natural answer is that it’s just the credal state represented by the set of probability 
functions C. This yields: 
  
Permission for Imprecision Precisified. For any non-singleton set of probability functions C, if 
the only evidence an agent has concerning the propositions in X is that the objective chance 
function for X is in C, then the agent is permitted by epistemic rationality to adopt an imprecise 
credal state represented by C. 
  
In what follows, we show that some imprecise credal states, which are predicted to be rationally 
permissible by Permission for Imprecision Precisified, will always be accuracy-dominated for any 
plausible way of measuring the accuracy of imprecise credal states. 
  
To see why, we need to introduce two more principles. The first is a principle that most accuracy-
centered epistemologists accept. 
  
The Non-Dominance Principle. From an epistemic standpoint, it is rationally 
impermissible for an agent to adopt a credal state D if, according to every 
legitimate  global measure of accuracy, D is weakly-accuracy dominated by some credal 
state D*, i.e., for every epistemically possible world, D* is just as accurate as D, and 
there exists at least one epistemically possible world w* in W where D* is more accurate 
than D.20 
  
The Non-Dominance Principle underlies various central results of accuracy-centered epistemology, e.g., 
Joyce’s (1998, 2009) argument for Probabilism and Briggs and Pettigrew’s (forthcoming) argument for 
Bayesian conditionalization. As we understand the matter, the Non-Dominance Principle is a minimal 
commitment about epistemic rationality that any accuracy-centered epistemologist should take on 
                                               
20 This principle is in fact controversial. On the one hand, it is subject to what has come to be known as the Bronfman objection: 
Bronfman (ms.) argues that a doxastic state needn’t be rationally impermissible to adopt merely because it is dominated by some 
other doxastic state on every legitimate accuracy measure; for there might not be any one doxastic state which dominates it on 
every legitimate accuracy measure. For a reply, see Pettigrew (2016). On the other hand, it is also attacked by Pettigrew (2013) 
who defends Undominated Dominance instead. See, for discussion, footnote 11. Note that our argument here will go through 
even with Undominated Dominance; for we show in our proof of Proposition 3 that some imprecise probabilistic credal states 
are accuracy-dominated by probabilistic precise credal states. Since probabilistic credal states are not dominated by other credal 
states (by Probabilistic Admissibility), the relevant imprecise credal states will be ruled out by Undominated Dominance. 
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board.  So, if there are indeed imprecise credal states that are ruled permissible by Permission for 
Imprecision Precisified but ruled impermissible by the Non-Dominance Principle, then Permission for 
Imprecision cannot be accommodated within accuracy-centered epistemology. 
 
The second principle we want introduce is: 
 
The Joycean Constraint. For any partition X over W, if GX is a legitimate global measure of 
accuracy for individual credence functions defined over X, then, for any probabilistically 
incoherent credence function b defined over X, there is a probability function p that weakly 
accuracy-dominates it, i.e., for every world w in W, GX(b,w) ≤ GX(p,w) and there exists a world 
w* in W, GX(b,w*) < GX(p,w*).  
 
We call this the Joycean constraint, since Joyce (1998, 2009) proves this claim from other assumptions 
about legitimate accuracy measures in his attempt to justify Probabilism by appealing to accuracy-based 
considerations.21 The Joycean Constraint and the Non-Dominance Principle together imply that if an 
agent has a precise credal state, then that doxastic state is rationally permissible only if it is representable 
by a probability function. This gives us a partial defense of Probabilism. 
 
Using the Joycean Constraint, we can now show that there are certain imprecise credal states 
deemed rational by Permission for Imprecision Precisified that violate the Non-Dominance Principle. 
Consider the following two cases:  
 
FOUR-SIDED MYSTERY DIE. You have a four-sided die that was made at a factory where they can 
make dice of pretty much any bias. You’ve seen dice that always land on the same side, dice that 
always land on two sides with a frequency ratio 2:1 and never on the other two sides, etc. You 
have no idea whatsoever what bias your particular die has. What should your credence be that 
when you roll the die, it will land with side <1> up? 
 
FIVE-SIDED MYSTERY DIE. You have a five-sided die that was made at a factory where they can 
make dice of pretty much any bias. You’ve seen dice that always land on the same side, dice that 
always land on two sides with a frequency ratio 2:1 and never on the other three sides, etc. You 
                                               
21 Also, see Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010), and Pettigrew (2016). 
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have no idea whatsoever what bias your particular die has. What should your credence be that 
when you roll the die, it will land with side <1> up? 
 
Suppose your credences in these cases are defined over the partitions X={P1,P2,P3,P4} and 
X*={P1*,P2*,P3*,P4*,P5*} respectively, where any Pi is the proposition that the four-sided die lands with 
side <i> facing up, and Pi* is the proposition that the five-sided die lands with side <i> facing up. Since 
you have no idea about the bias of the die, Permission for Imprecision Precisified entails that it is 
rationally permissible for you in FOUR-SIDED MYSTERY DIE to adopt an imprecise credal state 
represented by the set of probability functions C such that, for any P in X, C(P)=[0,1]. Similarly, in FIVE-
SIDED MYSTERY DIE, it is rationally permissible for you to adopt a doxastic state represented by the 
set of probability functions C* such that, for any P in X*, C*(P)=[0,1]. 
 
Now the main idea is this (for details, see the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix). According 
to Proposition 2, Local Extension, Local Boundedness, Local-Global Connection, and Local 
Admissibility guarantee that there is a precise credence function p such that the credences it assigns to 
cells in X is just as locally accurate as the imprecise credal assignments made by C. Likewise, we can 
construct a precise credence function p* such that the credences it assigns to the propositions in X* are 
just as accurate as the credal assignments made by C*. But it will turn out that either p or p* must be 
probabilistically incoherent. Then, by the Joycean Constraint, either p or p* is weakly accuracy-
dominated. But since p is as accurate as C in every possible world, and p* is as accurate as C* in every 
possible world, this means that either C or C* is weakly accuracy-dominated.  Thus, it seems that if the 
Joycean Constraint is true, some imprecise doxastic states that are allowed by Permission for 
Imprecision Precisified violate the Non-Dominance Principle and hence are irrational.  Thus, 
Permission for Imprecision Precisified is false. 
 
But note that the considerations raised in the preceding paragraph actually show something 
stronger: namely, certain probabilistic imprecise credal states will be accuracy-dominated given our 
constraints on accuracy measures, and will therefore violate Probabilistic Admissibility. So, in effect, 
the following impossibility result holds: 
 
Proposition 3. If Extension, Local Extension, Local Boundedness, Local Admissibility, 
Local-Global Connection, and Probabilistic Admissibility are true, then the Joycean 
Constraint is false. 
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4.3 Summary 
  
Let’s sum up. In this section, we have shown that given certain plausible constraints on local measures of 
accuracy, the accuracy-centered epistemologist can accept neither Weak Requirement of Imprecision 
nor the most natural precisification of Permission for Imprecision. If Weak Requirement of 
Imprecision and Permission for Imprecision were true, then imprecise credal states would be rationally 
permissible to adopt in any situation involving non-specific evidence, and might sometimes even be 
required. However, there’s no easy way of reconciling this thesis with accuracy-centered epistemology. 
  
Note that the defender of imprecise credences cannot get out of this problem by retreating to the 
position that some other precisification of Permission for Imprecision is true. This is because the 
impossibility result given by Proposition 3 poses a dilemma for the accuracy-centered epistemologist 
who also wants to defend the rationality of imprecise credences. It shows that if Extension, Local 
Extension, Local Boundedness, Local-Global Connection and Local Admissibility are correct, then 
she must either reject the Joycean Constraint or Probabilistic Admissibility. On the one hand, since the 
accuracy-centered epistemologist needs the Joycean Constraint for accuracy-dominance arguments for 
Probabilism, she cannot reject it without non-trivial costs.  On the other hand, Probabilistic 
Admissibility is attractive for the reasons discussed above. Therefore, the upshot of our argument is just 
that if our constraints on legitimate measures of accuracy are correct, then there is no satisfactory method 
of measuring the accuracy of imprecise credal states.  This is why the consequences of Proposition 3 are 
much more serious than that of any other results that we have proved.22 In the remainder of this paper, we 
will discuss a few possible responses to our argument. 
  
5. Response 1: Adopting Non-Numerical Measures of Accuracy 
 
Throughout this paper, we have focused on a framework of accuracy-centered epistemology which makes 
use of numerical measures of accuracy, i.e., measures of accuracy that assign real values to credal states 
or credal assignments to propositions. This is precisely why we required that legitimate global and local 
                                               
22 Proposition 3 also undermines plausible views that recognize epistemic values besides accuracy, but nevertheless want to 
admit that accuracy is an important goal of credences. One example of such a view is the one developed by Mayo-Wilson and 
Wheeler (2016) who hold that while considerations of accuracy don’t favor imprecise credences in such situations as MYSTERY 
COIN, the fact that they fit better with the unspecific nature of the agent’s evidence is a reason to adopt these credences in cases 
when precise credences and imprecise credences fare equally well with respect to accuracy. Proposition 3 undermines their 
argument because it shows that at least some seemingly rational imprecise credal states are accuracy-dominated by precise ones, 
and therefore don’t fare equally well as those precise states with respect to accuracy. 
 25 
measures of accuracy satisfy Boundedness and Local Boundedness, which entail that both global and 
local measures of accuracy should output real values. One may reject this constraint on measures of 
accuracy. A natural motivation for having non-numerical measures of accuracy─which Mayo-Wilson and 
Wheeler (2016) attribute to James Joyce─is this. One might argue that when an agent’s doxastic attitude 
towards a proposition is not representable by a real number, then the accuracy of her credal assignment 
should similarly not be representable by a real number.23 Since the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 depend 
on Boundedness and Local Boundedness, using non-numerical measures of accuracy can help us block 
result like Propositions 2 and 3. 
 
However, simply using non-numerical measures of accuracy does not by itself help us reconcile 
the rationality of imprecise credences with the accuracy-centered approach to epistemology. This is 
because a similar (though slightly weaker) result than Proposition 2 can also be proved for non-
numerical measures of accuracy.  
 
We begin with two prima facie attractive constraints  on non-numerical measures of accuracy: 
Strong Extensionality and Completeness. Consider Strong Extensionality. To state this constraint 
precisely, we need to introduce the notion of an accuracy profile. Suppose C is a set of credence functions 
defined over a partition X. The accuracy profile of C at a world w is the following multiset: 
{{(vw(P),C(P)): P∈X}}24 
In other words, the accuracy profile of C at w contains, for each proposition in X, the pair consisting of 
the truth value of that proposition at w, and the set of credences that C assigns to that proposition. Strong 
Extensionality says that the accuracy of C at w is determined entirely by the accuracy profile of C at w. 
That is: 
Strong Extensionality. For any partition X over a set of worlds W, let C and C* be sets of 
credence functions in BX. If GX* is a legitimate imprecise global measure of accuracy, and the 
accuracy profile of C at w in W is the same as the accuracy profile of C* at w* in W, then 
GX*(C,w) = GX*(C*,w*).25 
                                               
23 We discuss two proposals of this kind in Appendix B.  
24 A multiset is a collection that, unlike a set, allows multiple instances of its elements. For example, {a,a,b} and {a,b} are 
different multisets. However, order does not matter, so {a,a,b} and {a,b,a} are the same multiset. 
25 Pettigrew (2016) and Schoenfield (2015) accept Strong Extensionality. 
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The rationale for Strong Extensionality is that the accuracy of a credal state at a world should only 
depend on (i) the truth values at that world of the propositions over which the credal state is defined 
and (ii) the values that the credal state assigns to those propositions. To reject Strong Extensionality 
is to allow measures of accuracy to be sensitive to factors other than truth-values of propositions and 
the relevant credal assignments, e.g., factors like the informativeness of the propositions. But why 
should a measure that assesses solely the accuracy of credal states and not something else be sensitive 
to such factors? Thus, rejecting Strong Extensionality is a bad idea. 
The second constraint---Completeness---is more questionable: it says that any legitimate 
accuracy measure for imprecise credal states must be such that every credal state should be 
comparable with respect to global accuracy with all other credal states. 
Completeness. For any partition X over a set of worlds W, let C and C* be sets of credence 
functions in BX. If GX* is a legitimate imprecise global measure of accuracy, then, for any w in 
W, either GX*(C,w) > GX*(C*,w) or GX*(C,w) < GX*(C*,w) or GX*(C,w) = GX*(C*,w).26 
Note that Completeness trivially follows from Boundedness (since it would be true whenever GX* 
assigns real values), but it is also much weaker. According to Completeness, any legitimate measure of 
accuracy should be such that the global accuracy of one credal state under that rule must either be greater 
than, less than, or equal to the global accuracy of another credal state. Now, this constraint may indeed be 
true of non-numerical measures of accuracy. 
 
With these two constraints in place, we can prove the following claim (which generalizes another 
result proved by Schoenfield (2015)). 
 
Proposition 4. For any finite partition X over a set of worlds W, let C and C* be sets of 
probability functions in BX, such that for any P in X and some set of real numbers R, C(P) = R 
and C*(P) = {1/|X|}. If Strong Extensionality, Completeness, and Probabilistic 
Admissibility are true, then, for any legitimate imprecise global measure of accuracy GX* and 
any world w in W, GX*(C,w) = GX*(C*,w).  
                                               
26 Our statement of this constraint involves some abuse of notation. Presumably, the greater than relation denoted by ‘>’ only 
holds between numerical values. However, we are assuming that it also holds between non-numerical values. However, this use 
of notation is harmless, since we could restate everything we have said using a different greater than relation denoted by ' ≻’. 
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Let’s see what this means. Consider the Principle of Indifference, i.e., the principle that for any finite 
partition X over a set of worlds W, an agent’s credence in any P in X (in the absence of evidence that 
favours any particular P) should be 1/|X|. According to Proposition 4, any imprecise credal state that 
assigns an interval [a,b] to every cell of a finite partition is just as accurate as the precise credal state 
recommended by the Principle of Indifference with respect to that partition. For instance, take the case 
where X = {FH, FT, BH, BT}. If our evidence is maximally unspecific about the bias of the coin, the 
same line of reasoning that motivates Requirement of Imprecision should also require the agent to 
adopt an imprecise credal state that assigns [0,1] to each cell of this extended partition.27 But 
Proposition 4, in conjunction with other assumptions, shows that this is false. For if Completeness, 
Strong Extensionality, and Probabilistic Admissibility are true, then the credal state that is 
mandated by the Principle of Indifference (and therefore assigns ¼ to each cell in the partition) is just 
as accurate as the imprecise credal state in every world. And if the Permission Principle is true, then 
the agent cannot be required to adopt either of these two credal states in any world. This immediately 
undermines some of the motivation for both Requirement of Imprecision and Weak Requirement 
of Imprecision. 
Even though Proposition 4 (unlike Propositions 2 and 3) doesn’t straightforwardly refute 
Weak Requirement of Imprecision or Permission for Imprecision, it poses a problem for Weak 
Requirement of Imprecision.28 In conjunction with Completeness, Strong Extensionality, 
                                               
27 Note that someone who wants to allow for the rationality of a credal state that assigns [0,1] to each cell of a partition may face 
other problems, e.g., those discussed by Rinard (2013). However, the problem we are raising doesn’t depend on the fact that the 
agent assigns [0,1] to each cell of a four-cell partition; the problem could arise even if the assignment were [0.1., 0.7].  
28 An additional problem might be that Proposition 4 (along with the Permission Principle, Completeness, Strong 
Extensionality, and Probabilistic Admissibility) implies that the Principal Principle is false (see also Schoenfield (2015)). In 
order to see why this is so, consider two different probabilistic credal states, represented by the sets of credence functions C1 and 
C2 defined over an n-cell partition X, such that for any P in X, C1(P)=[0,1] and C2(P)={1/n}. Now, suppose an agent has 
conclusive evidence that the objective chance of any P in X is 1/n. So, she is required by the Principal Principle to adopt the 
credal state represented by C2 in this scenario (provided that she doesn’t possess any inadmissible information). But, given 
Proposition 4, Completeness, Strong Extensionality, and Probabilistic Admissibility, both these credal states are equally 
accurate in every world. Therefore, Proposition 4, Completeness, Strong Extensionality, and Probabilistic Admissibility 
(together with the Permission Principle) conflict with the Principal Principle. 
However, we suspect that this problem may not ultimately be unsurmountable. Here is a possible strategy. If the agent adopts an 
imprecise credal state in a scenario where she has conclusive evidence about what the chance distribution over the relevant 
partition is, a number of credence functions in the representor (i.e., the set of credence functions that represents her credal state) 
will violate the Principal Principle, so the overall imprecise state will also be irrational. (In the next section, we give a similar 
argument for ruling out the rationality of non-probabilistic imprecise credal states by appealing to a principle called Rational 
Admissibility. We argue that since the set of credence functions that represents a non-probabilistic imprecise credal state 
contains probabilistically incoherent credence functions, and probabilistically incoherent credence functions are rationally 
impermissible to adopt for accuracy-based reasons, such non-probabilistic imprecise credal states are rationally impermissible to 
adopt even though they match other probabilistic credal states with respect to global accuracy.) Assuming that there are accuracy-
based arguments for the Principal Principle (e.g., the ones discussed by Pettigrew (2012, 2016)), we could indeed show that there 
is some accuracy-based disadvantage to adopting an imprecise credal state which is represented by a set of credence functions 
that are not all compatible with the Principal Principle. 
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Probabilistic Admissibility, and the Permission Principle, Proposition 4 implies that an agent can 
never be required to adopt an imprecise credal state that assigns the same set of credences, e.g., an 
interval [a,b], to every cell of the partition. Call such imprecise credal states uniform. Proposition 4 
(along with the other constraints) entails that if an agent is ever required to adopt an imprecise credal 
state in response to a body of non-specific evidence, the relevant credal state must be non-uniform. If 
the defender of Weak Requirement of Imprecision accepts this claim, she must explain why uniform 
imprecise credal states should be treated differently from non-uniform imprecise credal states. In any 
plausible case of non-specific evidence, what seems to make an imprecise credal state rationally 
required is just the fact that the agent has no information about the propositions contained in the 
relevant partition, except for the information that the chance distribution over that partition lies within 
a certain set of probability distributions. As long as that set of probability distributions assigns the 
same set of real numbers to each cell of the partition, we will continue to have the intuition that the 
agent is required to adopt a uniform imprecise credal state in that situation. Thus, it just seems ad hoc 
to claim that there can be situations of non-specific evidence where an agent is required to adopt non-
uniform credal states, but there can’t be situations of non-specific evidence where she is required to 
adopt uniform credal states. In order to make her account less ad hoc, the defender of imprecise 
credences would have to reject Weak Requirement of Imprecision. 
The defender of non-numerical measures of accuracy could block this argument by rejecting 
either Completeness, or Strong Extensionality, or Probabilistic Admissibility. For now, let’s set aside 
the question of rejecting Probabilistic Admissibility: while rejecting Probabilistic Admissibility would 
block all the results we have proved so far, it is far from clear whether rejecting it will help the defender 
of imprecise credences in this context.29 Now, the non-numerical accuracy measures that have been 
proposed in the literature on imprecise credences – e.g., the one proposed by Seidenfeld, Schervish and 
Kadane (2012) and another ascribed to James Joyce by Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016) –violate either 
                                               
29 In this context, rejecting Probabilistic Admissibility could be counter-productive. Consider two different probabilistic credal 
states, represented by the sets of credence functions C1 and C2 defined over an n-cell partition X, such that for any P  in X, 
C1(P)=[a,b] and C2(P)={1/n}. Proposition 4 (along with the other constraints) entails that these two credal states have the same 
global accuracy score in every world. If the defender of imprecise credence rejects Probabilistic Admissibility in this context, 
she would have to allow one of the credal states to strongly accuracy-dominate the other. If the imprecise credal state accuracy-
dominates the other state, then, by the Non-Dominance Principle, she will now be committed to claim that from an accuracy-
centered standpoint, it is never rationally permissible for an agent to adopt a probabilistically coherent credal state that assigns 
1/n to each cell of an n-cell partition. But there are cases where the Principal Principle will require such a credal state, so that 
seems bad. If the precise credal state accuracy-dominates the other state, then, by the Non-Dominance Principle, the defender of 
imprecise credences will now be committed to claim that from an accuracy-centered standpoint, it is never rationally permissible 
for an agent to adopt a probabilistically coherent credal state that assigns an interval [a,b] to all the cells of an n-cell partition. 
This will be inconsistent with the natural precisification of Permission for Imprecision that we discussed in §4.2, thus leaving 
some of the problems for the defender of imprecise credences intact. 
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Completeness or Strong Extensionality (see Appendix B). We have already explained why rejecting 
Strong Extensionality is a bad idea. So, the only remaining option for the defender of imprecise 
credences would be to adopt measures of accuracy that violate Completeness. 
 
We think rejecting Completeness will not help the defender of Weak Requirement of 
Imprecision. Consider two different probabilistic credal states, represented by the sets of credence 
functions C1 and C2 defined over an n-cell partition X, such that for any P in X, C1(P)=[a,b] and 
C2(P)={1/n}. There are two options: either the defender of Weak Requirement of Imprecision could say 
that an agent cannot ever be in a situation of non-specific evidence where adopting the credal state 
corresponding to C1 is required by rationality, or she could deny this. The first option, as we have argued, 
makes the defense of Weak Requirement of Imprecision ad hoc. The second option involves saying 
that an agent can be required by rationality to adopt the imprecise credal state represented by C1. But note 
that if the defender of Weak Requirement of Imprecision wants to avoid the consequences of 
Proposition 4 by denying Completeness, she would have to say that the imprecise credal state 
represented by C1 is incomparable with respect to global accuracy to the precise credal state represented 
by C2 in every possible world.30 Now, plausibly, if two credal states are incomparable to each other with 
respect to global accuracy in every possible world, then a rational agent cannot regard any one of the 
credal states as better than, worse than, or exactly as good as the other given solely the metric of global 
accuracy. Then, given solely considerations about global accuracy, an agent also cannot have any reason 
to adopt the imprecise credal state over the precise one. 
 
This raises a challenge for the defender of Weak Requirement of Imprecision. If she wants 
to say that an agent can be required by rationality to adopt the imprecise credal state represented by C1, 
she must explain, without appealing to the global accuracy of that credal state, how there could be an 
accuracy-based advantage to adopting that credal state. The most natural explanation would be that the 
imprecise credal state matches the specificity of the agent’s evidence, while the precise credal state 
doesn’t. But this explanation is not satisfying: it’s unclear why it is better from an accuracy-centered 
standpoint to match one’s credal state to the specificity of one’s evidence. In the absence of a good 
explanation, Weak Requirement of Imprecision cannot be saved by rejecting Completeness. 
                                               
30 Here is why. Each of these two credal states has the same accuracy profile in every possible world and therefore, by Strong 
Extensionality, they have the same global accuracy score in every world. Hence, if the defender of imprecise credences wants to 
avoid violations of Probabilistic Admissibility, she must say either that they match each other with respect to global accuracy in 
every world or that they are incomparable everywhere. Since the first option is bad for reasons discussed earlier, the defender of 
imprecise credences must say that they are incomparable with respect to global accuracy in every world. 
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Our argument in this section leaves open the possibility that Permission for Imprecision can 
be true from an accuracy-centered standpoint. Therefore, one consequence of our argument is that a 
defender of imprecise credences who adopts the strategy of adopting non-numerical accuracy 
measures can only plausibly accept Permission for Imprecision but not Weak Requirement of 
Imprecision. Since a view of this kind seems quite weak, the defender of imprecise credences might 
ultimately have to seek a different way of defending the rationality of imprecise credences from an 
accuracy-centered standpoint. 
6. Response 2: Rejecting Probabilistic Admissibility 
The consequences of Proposition 3 are far more serious than that of any other results that we have proved 
so far. As we pointed out above, it shows that given our constraints on accuracy measures for imprecise 
credences, there is no measure of accuracy that respects both the Joycean Constraint and Probabilistic 
Admissibility. Since both these principles are attractive from an accuracy-centered standpoint, this just 
shows that there is no satisfactory method of measuring the accuracy of imprecise credal states using 
numerical accuracy measures. In this section, we will explore whether a defender of imprecise credences 
can avoid this consequence by rejecting Probabilistic Admissibility. 
 
Interestingly, some have in fact been tempted to reject Probabilistic Admissibility. For instance, 
Konek (forthcoming) proposes a global accuracy measure which violates this constraint (see Appendix 
C). Note that, for the accuracy-centered epistemologist, rejecting Probabilistic Admissibility outright is 
a bad idea, since much of the work done in accuracy-centered epistemology depends on the idea that 
precise probability functions shouldn’t be accuracy-dominated. But perhaps she can adopt a restricted 
version of Probabilistic Admissibility instead, such as:  
 
Restricted Probabilistic Admissibility. For any set of worlds W and a partition X over 
W, if GX* is a legitimate imprecise global accuracy measure for sets of credence functions 
defined over X, then for any probability function p in BX, there is no set C of credence 
functions in BX such that p is accuracy-dominated by C according to GX*.  
 
In other words, there is no set C in BX such that 
 
(i) for every world w in W, GX*({p},w) ≤ GX*(C,w), and  
(ii) there exists a world w in W such that GX*({p},w) < GX*(C,w). 
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Restricted Probabilistic Admissibility preserves the idea that precise credence functions shouldn’t be 
accuracy-dominated, but it nevertheless avoids the impossibility result from the preceding section. 
Importantly, Konek’s global measure of accuracy violates not only Probabilistic Admissibility, but also 
Restricted Probabilistic Admissibility (see Appendix C). However, even if it were possible to formulate 
accuracy measures for imprecise credal states that preserve Restricted Probabilistic Admissibility, 
adopting such a weak principle still seems highly problematic to us.  
 
Now, it may be possible to reconcile Permission for Imprecision with accuracy-centered 
epistemology by retreating to Restricted Probabilistic Admissibility. However, this strategy might be 
reasonable if only a handful of imprecise credal states were accuracy-dominated in the way Proposition 3 
suggests. In such a case, the defender of imprecise credences might still be able to hold that in most but 
not all cases of non-specific evidence, an agent is permitted to have imprecise credences. But we think 
that on the view proposed here, it is highly likely that not just some but most imprecise credal states are 
accuracy-dominated by some precise credence function. In order to see this, note that the proof of 
Proposition 2 is a proof by construction. More specifically, it proceeds by constructing a precise 
credence function that is just as accurate as the imprecise credal state by considering in isolation the 
appropriate credence that the precise function needs to assign to each proposition in the relevant partition, 
so that both the precise and the imprecise states have the same local accuracy score with respect to each 
proposition (and then Local-Global Connection guarantees that this function will be just as accurate 
globally).  But there is nothing in this procedure that guarantees that the precise credence function will be 
probabilistically coherent; for it may well be that all the individual credal assignments that the precise 
function assigns to different propositions in the partition don’t add up to exactly 1.  
 
One last point: the proof of Proposition 3 shows that if we accept certain constraints on 
legitimate accuracy measures for imprecise credal states and the Joycean Constraint, some probabilistic 
imprecise credal states that seem rational in light of Permission for Imprecision will end up being 
accuracy-dominated. Now, the accuracy-centered epistemologist may reject Probabilistic Admissibility 
and accept Restricted Probabilistic Admissibility on the ground that only a small number of 
probabilistic imprecise doxastic states end up being accuracy-dominated on the resulting view. Still, a 
problem will persist; for the imprecise credal states that are ruled out by our constraints look just like all 
the other credal assignments the defender of imprecise credences endorses. Thus, it seems that if this is 
the route that the accuracy-centered epistemologist wants to go, she owes us an independent story as to 
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which imprecise credal states are irrational, and which are not. Otherwise the kinds of credal assignments 
the defender of imprecise credences will endorse will turn out to be hopelessly unsystematic. 
 
 
7. Response 3: Rejecting Local-Global Connection 
 
A promising strategy for blocking the arguments for both Propositions 2 and 3 would be to reject Local-
Global Connection.31 Local-Global Connection involves two constraints. According to the first, for any 
legitimate global accuracy measure, there exists a legitimate local accuracy measure such that if two 
credal states make equally accurate credal assignments to each proposition in a partition according to the 
local measure, then the global accuracy of the two states is the same according to the global measure. 
According to the second, for any legitimate local accuracy measure, there exists a legitimate global 
accuracy measure, such that if two credal states make equally accurate credal assignments to each 
proposition in a partition according to the local measure, then the global accuracy of the two states is the 
same according to the global measure. 
  
Local-Global Connection can lead to problems. We might think that even if the credal 
assignments made by two imprecise credal states have the same local accuracy scores, the global accuracy 
score of the two states might still differ. Suppose C is a set of probability functions such that, for any P in 
X={H, T}, C(P) = [0.2, 0.8]. Now, take another set of credence functions C* which contains all the 
probability functions in C but contains one probabilistically incoherent function b such that, for any P in 
X, b(P) = 0.8. But note that for any P in X, C(P) = C*(P). Therefore, by Local-Global Connection, the 
global accuracy of C and C* ought to be the same. This might seem like a bad consequence of Local-
Global Connection: if C and C* have the same global accuracy score, there is no hope for offering an 
accuracy-dominance argument for Probabilism with respect to imprecise credal states (i.e. for a view that 
all the credence functions in one’s representor have to be probability functions). This might lead us to 
reject Local-Global Connection. If we reject it, we are able to block Proposition 2 and Proposition 3. 
  
We have two counter-responses. First of all, even if the defender of imprecise credences rejects 
Local-Global Connection, it won’t help her block Proposition 4. She will end up rejecting the Weak 
Requirement of Imprecision (as shown in §5) as long as she accepts Completeness, Strong 
Extensionality, and Probabilistic Admissibility. 
                                               
31 Recall that the motivation for Local Admissibility also appeals to similar considerations. So, if we reject Local-Global 
Connection, we may also have to reject Local Admissibility.
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Second, Local-Global Connection still seems independently appealing. It’s motivated by the 
natural thought that the global accuracy of a doxastic state (which involves doxastic attitudes towards 
different propositions) should depend only on the local accuracy of the doxastic attitudes that it involves. 
So, if there are two doxastic states which involve doxastic attitudes that match each other perfectly with 
respect to local accuracy, then the two doxastic states should not be more or less globally accurate than 
each other. So far, we have had no reason to think that this principle should fail with respect to precise 
credal states or with respect to imprecise probabilistic credal states. This might give us reason to think 
that the principle is true across the board. This in turn might give us reason to search for a different 
solution to the problem mentioned above. Here is a sketch of such a solution. 
  
In response to the problem raised above, we ought to concede that when it comes to imprecise 
credal states, there is no straightforward accuracy-dominance argument for Probabilism. This, however, 
doesn’t mean that there is no accuracy-based reason for ruling out non-probabilistic credal states like the 
one represented by C*. It seems to us that a defender of imprecise credences should accept the following 
principle on independent grounds: 
  
Rational Admissibility. An agent is rationally permitted to adopt an imprecise credal state 
represented by a set C of credence functions only if C is a rationally admissible set of credence 
functions, i.e., for any credence function b in C, there is some epistemic situation in which it is 
rationally permissible for an agent to adopt b. 
  
This requirement should be intuitively attractive for the defender of imprecise credences. She should want 
the credence functions in the representor to be such that, on receiving more information, it can be 
rationally permissible for the agent to adopt each credence function in the representor as her actual 
credence function. For example, in MYSTERY COIN, the only credence functions that should be in your 
representor ought to be those that you would be permitted to adopt on gaining more information about the 
bias of the coin. If this requirement is correct, it will be enough to rule out the possibility that the non-
probabilistic credal states (represented by sets of credence functions some of which may be 
probabilistically incoherent) are ever rationally permissible to adopt. Joyce’s (1998, 2009) accuracy-
dominance argument shows that probabilistically incoherent credence functions are never rationally 
permissible to adopt, because they are accuracy-dominated by some other, coherent function. So, a set of 
credence functions that contains probabilistically incoherent credence functions will be rationally 
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inadmissible, and therefore a credal state represented by such a set of credence functions will be ruled out 
by Rational Admissibility. 
  
An apparent cost of Rational Admissibility is that it conflicts with the Permission Principle. 
We are saying that an agent may be rationally required to adopt the probabilistic credal state represented 
by C over the non-probabilistic credal state represented by C* even though the global accuracy of C and 
C* is the same. Given that we ourselves have relied on the Permission Principle in our argument against 
Weak Requirement of Imprecision given in §4.1, the strategy of accepting Rational Admissibility 
seems to undermine our own argument. However, this may in fact indicate that the accuracy-centered 
epistemologist should accept a different version of the Permission Principle that is restricted to 
rationally admissible doxastic states. As far as we can tell, adopting this more restricted version of the 
Permission Principle doesn’t affect our argument against Weak Requirement of Imprecision. This is 
because, for any imprecise probabilistic credal state, Proposition 2 guarantees that, given our constraints 
on measures of accuracy, there is another precise credal state that is just as accurate as the imprecise one. 
Now, there are two possibilities: either that precise credal state is probabilistically coherent, or it’s not. If 
it is probabilistically coherent, then the restricted version of the Permission Principle says that the agent 
isn’t required to have that imprecise probabilistic state. If it is not probabilistically coherent, then by the 
Joycean Constraint, there is a precise probabilistic credal state that accuracy-dominates it, and therefore 
accuracy-dominates the imprecise creedal state. In that case, too, the agent isn’t required to have that 
imprecise probabilistic state. In either case, Weak Requirement of Imprecision fails. 
  
The upshot is this. While it might be tempting for the defender of imprecise credences to reject 
Local-Global Connection in light of certain problems, this isn’t obviously a viable option. On the one 
hand, she will still have to deal with the problems that arose from Proposition 4. On the other hand, 
given the independent appeal of Local-Global Connection, other solutions to the relevant problems may 
also be worth pursuing. Moreover, if the defender of imprecise credences were able to show that our 
solution from Rational Admissibility doesn’t work and that Local-Global Connection is ultimately 
indefensible, that would in itself be a significant achievement. For it would show that certain initially 
attractive constraints, like Local-Global Connection, which accuracy-centered epistemologists happily 
accept when it comes to precise credal states, cannot be reconciled at all with the rationality of imprecise 
credences. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
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Let us take stock. A central motivation for imprecise credences comes from situations involving non-
specific evidence: for instance, when an agent has no information whatsoever about the bias of a coin, it 
seems that she is permitted, and perhaps even required, not to assign any sharp credence to the 
proposition that the coin will land heads (or tails) when flipped. Some take such scenarios to show that for 
any scenario where an agent’s total evidence is non-specific, she is required by rationality to adopt 
imprecise credences. We called this view Requirement of Imprecision. 
  
We began this essay with Schoenfield’s argument against Requirement of Imprecision. She 
shows that at least for imprecise probabilistic credal states defined over two-cell partitions, there is always 
a precise probabilistic credal state which is just as accurate as the imprecise state in every world. This 
shows that accuracy-centered epistemologists cannot accommodate Requirement of Imprecision.  
However, we showed that even if the defender of imprecise credences rejects Requirement of 
Imprecision in light of Schoenfield’s argument, she may still be able to allow imprecise credal states to 
be permissible in all situations of non-specific evidence, and required in some of them.  In response, we 
argued that if we accept some other plausible constraints on accuracy measures for imprecise credal 
states, this possibility is also blocked. Finally, we considered a number of responses to our argument, 
each of which involved rejecting one or more of the constraints that we imposed on measures of accuracy. 
We went to argue that each of these responses involve some intuitive or theoretical costs. The upshot of 
our argument, therefore, is that given our constraints, there is no plausible way of measuring the accuracy 
of imprecise credal states; so, the rationality of imprecise credences cannot easily be accommodated 
within accuracy-centered epistemology. 
 
Appendix A: Proofs 
 
Proposition 1. For any set of worlds W and a two-cell partition X over W, let C be a set of probability 
functions in BX (the set of credence functions defined over X). Then, if Extension, Boundedness, 
Probabilistic Admissibility, and World-Invariance are true, then, for any legitimate imprecise global 
accuracy measure GX*, there will be a probability function b in BX such that, for any w in W,  GX*(C,w) = 
GX*({b}, w). 
 
To prove Proposition 1, we need: 
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Lemma 1. For any set of worlds W, let X={H, T} be a partition over W. Then, if Probabilistic 
Admissibility and World-Invariance are true, for any legitimate imprecise global accuracy measure 
GX*, if C and C* are sets of probability functions defined over X, the following conditional holds: 
 
If (i) for any H-world w,  GX*(C,w) = GX*(C*,w), then (ii) for any T-world w*, GX*(C,w*) = 
GX*(C*,w*). 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the conditional is false: (i) is true, but (ii) isn’t. Then, there exists a T-world 
w* s.t. either GX*(C,w*) > GX*(C*,w*) or GX*(C,w*) < GX*(C*,w*). But note that by World-Invariance, 
if for a T-world w*, GX*(C,w*) > GX*(C*,w*), then, for every T-world w**, GX*(C,w**) > GX*(C*,w**). 
In that case, since (i) is true, C* will be weakly accuracy-dominated and therefore will violate 
Probabilistic Admissibility. A similar violation of Probabilistic Admissibility will occur if, for a T-
world w*, GX*(C,w*) < GX*(C*,w*). Therefore, (ii) must be true. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.  Suppose an imprecise doxastic state, defined over a partition X ={H,T}, is 
represented by a set C of probability functions in BX. By Boundedness, for any H-world w, GX*(C,w) is 
between 0 and 1. So by the continuity of GX over the space of probability functions, there is some 
probability function b in BX such that GX*(C,w) = GX(b,w). (This follows from the intermediate value 
theorem.) By Extension, it follows that GX*(C,w) = GX*({b},w). By World-Invariance, it follows that 
for every H-world w*, GX*(C,w*) = GX*({b},w*). Combining this with Lemma 1, we get that for every 
T-world w**, GX*(C,w**) = GX*({b},w**). Thus, Proposition 1 is proved. □ 
 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose an imprecise credal state, defined over a partition X over a set of worlds W, is 
represented by a set C of functions in BX. If Local Extension, Local Boundedness, Local Admissibility, 
and Local-Global Connection are true, then there will be a credence function b in BX such that for any 
legitimate imprecise global measure of accuracy GX*, GX*(C,w) = GX*({b},w) in every world w.  
 
To prove Proposition 2, we prove:  
 
Lemma 2. Suppose R is a set of real numbers between 0 and 1 (inclusive), and c is a real number between 
0 and 1 (inclusive). If Local Boundedness, Local Extension, and Local Admissibility are true, then, for 
any legitimate local measure of accuracy L*, L*(R, 1) = L*({c}, 1) iff L*(R, 0) = L*({c}, 0). 
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Proof of Lemma 2. Now, suppose L*(R, 1) = L*({c}, 1), but either (i) L*(R, 0) > L*({c}, 0) or (ii) L*(R, 
0) < L*({c}, 0). Let (i) be true. By Local Boundedness, L*(R,0) is between 1 and 0 (inclusive). Since 
L(.,0) is continuous through the unit interval [0,1], we can find a real number d between 0 and 1 such that 
L*(R,0) = L (d, 0) = L*({d},0) (once again, by the intermediate value theorem). But note that if (i) is true, 
d is distinct from c. We show that this cannot be the case. There are two possibilities. 
  
Possibility 1. Suppose c<d. Then, we pick a real number r between c and d (exclusive). Then, by 
Truth-Directedness and Local Extension,  
 
L*(R, 1) = L*({c},1)<L*({r}, 1). 
L*(R, 0) = L*({d}, 0)<L*({r}, 0). 
 
But, since {r} strongly accuracy-dominates R, we violate Local Admissibility.  
 
Possibility 2. Suppose c>d. Then, we pick a real number r between d and c (exclusive).Then, by 
Truth-Directedness, 
 
L*(R, 1) = L*({c},1)>L*({r}, 1). 
L*(R, 0) = L*({d}, 0)>L*({r}, 0). 
 
But, since {r} is strongly accuracy-dominated by R, we violate Local Admissibility.  
 
So, c=d. But in that case, (i) cannot be true. Similarly, (ii) cannot be true. The converse is proved exactly 
in the same way. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let C be a set of probability functions defined over a partition X over a set of 
worlds W. Let L* be an arbitrary legitimate local measure of accuracy. 
 
Consider any world w in W. For any proposition P in X, if w is in P, then the local accuracy of the 
credal assignment that C makes to P is L*(C(P),1). By Local Extension, there exists a legitimate local 
accuracy measure L of which L* is an extension. By Local Boundedness, L*(C(P),1) is between 1 and 0 
(inclusive). Since L(.,1) is continuous through the unit interval [0,1], we can find a real number x between 
0 and 1 (inclusive) such that L(x,1) = L*(C(P),1) (by the intermediate value theorem). Analogously, if w 
is not in P, then the local accuracy of the credal assignment that C makes to P is L*(C(P),0). By Local 
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Boundedness, L*(C(P),0) is between 1 and 0. Since L(.,0) is continuous through the unit interval [0,1], 
we can find a real number x between 0 and 1 such that L(x,0) = L*(C(P),0)  (by the intermediate value 
theorem). Therefore, for any P in X, there exists a real number x between 0 and 1 (inclusive) such that 
L*(C(P), vw(P)) =  L*({x}, vw(P)). This entails that there exists a credence function b, such that for any P 
in X, L*(C(P), vw(P)) =  L*({b(P)}, vw(P)). In other words, there exists a credence function b such that for 
any proposition P in X, the credal assignment made by b to P is just as locally accurate in w as the credal 
assignment made by C to P. 
  
Now, consider any world w* such that w≠w*. There are two possibilities: either w and w* belong 
to the same cell of the partition X, or they don’t. 
  
Possibility 1. If w and w* belong to the same cell of the partition X, then w* will assign the same 
truth-values to propositions in X as w; so, for any P in X, vw(P) = vw*(P). Hence, for any 
proposition P and any credence function b such that L*(C(P), vw(P)) =  L*({b(P)}, vw(P)), it will 
be the case that L*(C(P), vw*(P)) =  L*({b(P)}, vw*(P)). 
 
Possibility 2. If w and w* don’t belong to the same cell of the partition X, then there exist exactly 
two propositions P and P* in X such that w is in P but not in P* whereas w* is in P* but not in P. 
Therefore, vw(P) ≠ vw*(P) and vw(P*) ≠ vw*(P*). According to Lemma 2, however, for any sets of 
credences R and {c}, L*(R,1) = L*({c},1) iff L*(R,0) = L*({c},0). So, whatever P and P* may be, 
if L*(C(P),vw(P)) = L*({b(P)},vw(P)) and L*(C(P*),vw(P*)) = L*({b(P*)},vw(P*)), then 
L*(C(P),vw*(P)) = L*({b(P)},vw*(P)) and L*(C(P*),vw*(P*)) = L*({b(P*)},vw*(P*)). 
  
This entails that for any w in W and any P in X, L*(C(P),vw(P)) = L*({b(P)},vw(P)). Since L* is 
any arbitrary legitimate local accuracy measure, by Local-Global Connection, it follows that for any 
legitimate global measure of accuracy GX*, GX*(C,w) = GX* ({b},w). □ 
 
 
Proposition 3. If Extension, Local Extension, Local Boundedness, Local Admissibility, Local-Global 
Connection, and Probabilistic Admissibility are true, then the Joycean Constraint is false. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove this proposition for the general case. Let X={P1,...,Pn} and X*={P1*,..., 
Pn+1*}, both defined over the same set of worlds W.  Let C represent a probabilistic imprecise doxastic state 
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defined over X, such that for any P in X, C(P) = [0,1]. Similarly, let C* represent a probabilistic imprecise 
credal state defined over X*, such that for any P in X*, C*(P) = [0,1].  
 
By the proof of Proposition 2, if Local Extension, Local Boundedness, and Local 
Admissibility are true, we can show that for any legitimate local measure of accuracy L*, there exists a 
precise credence function b such that for any w in W and any proposition P in X, L*(C(P),vw(P)) = 
L*({b(P)},vw(P)) for all propositions P in X. Suppose, now, we construct a credence function b* such that 
for any Pi in X and Pi* in X* where i is between 1 and n (inclusive), b*(Pi*) = b(Pi). However, for the 
proposition Pn+1*, we let b*(Pn+1*) = r such that L*(C*(Pn+1*),vw(Pn+1*)) = L*({r},vw(Pn+1*)) for all w in 
W. That there will be such an r is guaranteed by Local Extension, Local Boundedness, and Lemma 2. 
Note that due to Local-Global Connection, this guarantees that for any w in W and for any legitimate 
global measure of accuracy GX**, GX**(C*,w) = GX**({b*},w). 
 
Now, we show that we are bound to get a violation of Probabilistic Admissibility in this case if 
the Joycean Constraint is true.  
 
Possibility 1. Suppose b is a probability function; then ∑P∈X b(P)=1. But now consider ∑P∈X* 
b*(P). Since b* assigns the same values to the first n cells in X* as b does to the first n cells in X, 
we have ∑P∈X* b*(P) = ∑P∈X b(P)+b*(Pn+1*) = 1+r. Here, there are two possibilities: either r>0 or 
r=0.  
 
Possibility 1.1. If r>0, b* is probabilistically incoherent. Then, by the Joycean 
Constraint, according to any legitimate precise global accuracy measure GX*, there is a 
probability function that weakly accuracy-dominates b*. By Extension, since GX** is an 
extension of a legitimate accuracy score GX*, according to GX**, C* is accuracy-
dominated by a precise credal state. Thus, we get a violation of Probabilistic 
Admissibility.  
 
Possibility 1.2. Now, consider the possibility that r=0. Let L* be any arbitrary local 
accuracy measure for imprecise credences. By Local Boundedness and Local 
Extension, L*({r},1) = 0 and  L*({r},0) = 1. Now, since C*(Pn+1*) = [0,1] and the local 
accuracy score of {r} and C*(Pn+1*) is the same relative to any truth-value, L*([0,1],0) = 
L*({0},0)=1 and L*([0,1],1) = L*({0},1) = 0. Consider the credence function b** such 
that for any P in X*, b**(P) = 0. Since for any P in X*, C*(P) = [0,1], this means that for 
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any P in X*, the local accuracy score of {b**(P)} and C*(P) will be the same relative to 
any truth-value. By Local-Global Connection, this implies that for any w in W, 
GX**(C*,w) = GX*({b**},w). Since b** is not a probability function, using the Joycean 
Constraint, we get the result that there exists a probability function that weakly 
accuracy-dominates b**. This means that C* is accuracy-dominated. Thus, we get a 
violation of Probabilistic Admissibility. 
 
Possibility 2. If b is not a probability function, using the Joycean constraint, we get the result 
that there exists a probability function that weakly accuracy-dominates b, and therefore weakly 
accuracy-dominates C. Again, we get a violation of Probabilistic Admissibility. □ 
 
Proposition 4. For any finite partition X over a set of worlds W, let C and C* be sets of probability 
functions in BX, such that for any P in X, C(P) =[a,b] and C*(P) = {1/|X|}. If Strong Extensionality, 
Completeness, and Probabilistic Admissibility are true, then, for any legitimate imprecise global 
measure of accuracy GX* and any world w in W, GX*(C, w) = GX*(C*,w).  
Proof of Proposition 4. Strong Extensionality implies that, for any two worlds w and w*, GX*(C, w) = 
GX*(C,w*) and GX*(C*, w) = GX*(C*,w*). This is because C and C* have the exact same accuracy profile 
in each world, since they assign [a,b] and 1/|X| respectively to the true propositions in every world w, as 
well as to all the false ones. Now pick one particular world w, and suppose that GX*(C, w) > GX*(C*, w). 
Then C* is more accurate than C in every other world w*, so C* weakly accuracy-dominates C. But this 
violates Probabilistic Admissibility. The same argument applies if we have GX*(C, w) < GX*(C*, w). 
Thus if we want to avoid a violation of Probabilistic Admissibility, we need to have GX*(C, w) = 
GX*(C*, w) for every world w. □ 
 
Appendix B: Non-Numerical Measures of Accuracy 
We want to consider two distinct proposals that lay down non-numerical measures of accuracy for 
imprecise credal states. 
 
The first proposal is one that Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016) attribute to Joyce. 
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Proposal 1. For any partition X over a set of worlds W, let GX be a legitimate global accuracy 
measure for precise credal states. Then, there exists a legitimate global accuracy measure GX* for 
imprecise credal states such that: 
 
For any world w in W and any set C of credence functions in BX, GX*(C, w)= {r: ∃b (b ∈ 
C & GX(b, w)=r)}.  
 
On this picture, the accuracy score of an imprecise credal state is just the set of accuracy scores assigned 
to the individual credence functions that it involves. The problem with this proposal is that it doesn’t 
obviously satisfy Completeness. Suppose there are two sets of probability functions C and C* defined 
over a two–cell partition {H, T}, such that C(H)=C(T)=[0.2,0.8], and C*(H)=C*(T)=[0.3,0.7]. Now, since 
C* is a subset of C, for any w, GX*(C*, w) will also be a subset of GX*(C, w). But how do we know which 
set of accuracy scores is greater than the other? Since there is no natural total preorder over sets of real 
numbers, it is not obvious that imprecise credal states on this view have to be comparable to each other 
with respect to global accuracy. Thus, Completeness may indeed fail. 
 
However, this isn’t the only way we could have non-numerical measures of accuracy. Seidenfeld, 
Schervish, and Kadane (2012) define a local measure of inaccuracy I where, for any x and y between 0 
and 1 (inclusive), I([x,y],1) reflects the inaccuracy of assigning the set of credences [x,y] to a proposition 
P when P is true, and I([x,y],0) reflects the inaccuracy of assigning [x,y] to a proposition P when P is 
false. The inaccuracy measure I is defined as follows: 
I([x,y],0) = <1+x2,y2> 
I([x,y],1) = <(1-x)2,(1-y)2+1> 
Let I([x,y], 0)<I([w,v], 0) iff  either (i) 1+x2<1+w2 or (ii) 1+x2 = 1+w2 and y2<v2. And let I([x,y], 
1)<I([w,v], 1) iff  either (i) (1-x)2<(1-w)2 or (ii) (1-x)2 = (1-w)2 and (1-y)2+1<(1-v)2+1. This local measure 
of inaccuracy is lexicographic because it ranks one assignment [w,v]  higher than another [x,y] one just in 
case either the first term in the score of [w,v] is greater than the first term in the score of [x,y] or if the first 
term in the scores of [x,y] and [w,v] are equal, but the first term in the score of [w,v] is greater than the 
first term in the score of [x,y].  
 
On the basis of this inaccuracy measure, Seidenfeld et al (2012) proposed a global measure of 
inaccuracy. For any partition X= {P1, P2,..., Pn} defined over a set of worlds W, IX is a global measure of 
inaccuracy, such that for any set of credence functions C defined over X, and any world w in W, IX(C, w) 
= <I(C(P1), vw(P1)), I(C(P2), vw(P2)), …, I(C(Pn), vw(Pn))>. Now, we can say that IX(C, w)> IX(C*, w) iff 
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either I(C(P1), vw(P1))> I(C*(P1), vw(P1)), or I(C(P1), vw(P1))= I(C*(P1), vw(P1)) and I(C(P2), 
vw(P2))>I(C*(P2), vw(P2)), or…, and so on. 
 
In effect, Seidenfeld et al.’s proposal is this: 
 
Proposal 2. For any partition X over a set of worlds W, there exists a legitimate imprecise global 
measure of accuracy GX* such that:  
 
If C and C* are sets of credence functions defined over X, then, for any world w in W, 
GX*(C, w)> GX*(C*, w) iff IX*(C, w)< IX*(C*, w), and GX*(C, w) = GX*(C*, w) iff IX*(C, 
w)= IX*(C*, w). 
 
But this proposal is incompatible with Strong Extensionality. Take a two-cell partition X={H,T}, and let 
there be a set of probability functions C defined over X, such that for any P in X, C(P)=[0.5., 0.5]. Note 
that I([0.5,0.5], 0) = <1.25,0.25> and I([0.5,0.5], 1) = <0.25,1.25>. So, for any H-world w, IX(C,w) = 
<<0.25,1.25>, <1.25,0.25>>. And, for any T-world w, IX(C,w) = <<1.25,0.25>, <0.25,1.25>>. Note that C 
has the same accuracy profile in every world. But since GX(C,w) is not equal to GX(C, w*) for every w and 
w*, Strong Extensionality fails. 
Appendix C: Konek’s Rejection of Probabilistic Admissibility 
 
Lastly, we want to show that the global measure of inaccuracy Konek (forthcoming) puts forward leads to 
a violation of Probabilistic Admissibility. For Konek, the inaccuracy of any set of credence functions C 
defined over a partition X in a world w is given by: 
 
IX*(C,w)=α. IX(a,w)+(1-α). IX(b,w),  
 
where a is the credence function with the lowest inaccuracy score in w, and b is the credence function 
with the highest score in w according to the inaccuracy measure IX (which is just a global measure of 
inaccuracy based on the Brier score).  
 
Importantly, Konek also proposes that α>½ in order to reflect the fact that the agent values 
avoiding error more than seeking truth. Suppose now that X={H,T}. Let C1 be a set of probability 
functions such that for any P in X, C1(P) = [0,1]. Let C2 be a set of probability functions such that for any 
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P in X, C2(P)={0.5}. Finally, let C3 be a set of probability functions such that for any P in X, C3(P)=[0.2, 
0.8].  
  
Now let us calculate the inaccuracy scores IX* assigns to these three sets of credence functions. In 
C2, the most inaccurate credence function is the same as the least accurate one. So, in any w in W,  
 
(i) IX*(C2, w) = α. (½ ((1-0.5)2 + (0.5-0)2)) + (1-α). (½ ((1-0.5)2 + (0.5-0)2)) = 0.25 
 
Note two things. 
 
1.  At any H-world w, the least inaccurate credence function in C1 is the credence function a1 where 
a1(H) = 1 and a1(T)=0, and the most inaccurate credence function in C1 is b1 where  b1(H) = 0 and 
b1(T)=1. And the least inaccurate function in C3 is the function a3 where a3(H)=0.8 and a3(T)=0.2, 
and the most inaccurate credence function is b3 where b3(H)=0.2 and b3(T)=0.8. 
2. Analogously, at any T-world w*, the least inaccurate credence function in C1 is the credence function 
b1 mentioned above, and the most inaccurate credence function in C1 is a1 mentioned above. 
Similarly, the least inaccurate function in C3 is the function b3 mentioned above, and the most 
inaccurate credence function is a3 mentioned above. 
 
Then, for any w in W,  
 
(ii) IX*(C1, w) = α. (½ ((1-1)2 + (0-0)2)) + (1-α). (½ ((1-0)2 + (0-1)2)) = (1-α) 
(iii) IX*(C3, w) = α. (½ ((1-0.8)2 + (0.2-0)2))  + (1-α). (½ ((1-0.2)2 + (0.8-0)2))  
      = 0.04α + 0.64 - 0.64α 
      = 0.64-0.6α 
 
Now notice the following: for any α>0.75, C1 accuracy-dominates C2, and, for any α<0.75, C2 accuracy 
dominates C1. Lastly, for α=0.75, C3 accuracy-dominates both C1 and C2. This means that a violation of 
Probabilistic Admissibility is inescapable on this view. 
 
In fact, Konek’s rule will also violate Restricted Probabilistic Admissibility when α>0.5. In 
order so see this, consider the accuracy scores IX* assigns to the doxastic state C4 which assigns 
[0.45,0.55] to each cell in X. In particular, for each world w, 
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(iv) IS*(C4, w) = α. (½ ((1-0.55)2 + (0-0.45)2)) + (1-α). (½ ((1-0.45)2 + (0-0.55)2))  
    = α.0.2025+(1-α).(0.3025) 
   =0.3025-α.0.1025 
 
Note that for α>0.53, IX*(C4, w) =0.248175<0.25=IX*(C2, w) for each world w. In other words, C4 
accuracy-dominates the precise probabilistic belief state C2. Note that we need Restricted Probabilistic 
Admissibility to be true in order for Joyce’s accuracy-dominance argument for Probabilism to go 
through. Hence, if we want to preserve that argument, we should reject Konek’s inaccuracy measure for 
imprecise credal states.32 
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